



FC III



CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS



BERKELEY
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LETTER FROM THE CHAIR

Hello Delegates!

My name is Vaishik Kota and I have the pleasure of being your head chair for FC 3 this year. I am a 4th year studying Molecular and Cell Biology with a focus in Medical Biology and Physiology. This is my 4th year in BMUN and my 7th year doing MUN. The Cuban Missile Crisis was the first committee I chaired when I came into college, so I am super excited to be head chairing it in my final year. Outside of BMUN, I am a Senior Advisor for the Healthcare Consulting Group at Berkeley. In my free time, I enjoy playing volleyball, bingeing TV, and eating good food! I'm stoked to see you all in committee soon!

Alex is a senior at Berkeley studying Mechanical Engineering. This is his 7th year doing MUN and 3rd year chairing FC. He is also the head chair for the American Labor Movement Committee for BMUN 72. Outside of MUN, he loves hiking, playing volleyball, and watching UFC and basketball.

Sanjay is a senior at Berkeley studying Molecular & Cellular Biology and Computer Science. This is his 8th year as a part of BMUN and his 4th year chairing BMUN, so he is excited for this new chapter! Outside of MUN he is passionate about bioinformatics, healthcare, working out, concerts, and soccer.

Vijay is a senior at Berkeley studying Computer Science. This is his 3rd year chairing BMUN (chaired for DISEC and JCC in the past) and he is excited to meet all of you. Outside of MUN he enjoys working out, playing basketball, concerts, and poker.


Nina is a Junior at Berkeley studying Political Science and Media Studies with a focus in Media Law and Policy. This is her first year being a part of BMUN and she is super excited for this year and to meet everyone. Outside of MUN she enjoys thrifting, concerts, playing volleyball, and reading.

Adriana is a sophomore at Berkeley majoring in Public Health and Theater and Performance Studies - minoring in public policy. This is her first year being a part of BMUN and is super excited to meet all of you and learn about all kinds of global affairs! Outside of MUN Adriana enjoys going to concerts - like Beyoncé! Is a fan of rap, jazz music, and pop music. As an LA native she is extremely passionate about advocacy for under-represented minorities and youth investment.

Sincerely,



Vaishik Kota
Cuban Missile Crisis
Email: chief@bmun.org




CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

TOPIC BACKGROUND

THE START OF THE COLD WAR

Before World War II had even ended, there was already a baseline of tension, rooted in the Soviets' anger about the Allies' delayed start to opening a second front against Germany and the United States' fear of Stalin and communism. At the end of World War II, although peace was "achieved," the leaders of the two emerging superpowers, Truman and Stalin, recognized the divided world which had developed throughout the 20th century. The two contrasting systems of capitalism and communism soon engulfed the world, further increasing ten-

sions that would last for decades. In this growing competition, the Soviet Union began taking over Eastern European countries, some before WWII ended and some after. The Soviets controlled these satellite states, from elections, to leaders, to laws ("The Warsaw Pact and Eastern Europe During the Cold War"). At the same time, the United States jumped at every opportunity to instill democracy in Western Europe and beyond, including Turkey, Greece, and Korea. This division led Winston Churchill to warn the world of the dangerous iron curtain descending through the middle of Europe ("Revelations from the Russian Archives").



After the war, hostility rose even more when it became clear that the Soviet Union was not upholding their promises from the Tehran Conference and Potsdam Agreement. First, the Soviet Union failed to remove their troops from Iran after six months of armistice in Europe, one of the terms agreed upon at the Tehran Conference (Cleveland). Next, the Soviet Union proved that they would not uphold the Potsdam Agreement, in which the Allies agreed to treat Germany as an economic unit (Cleveland). The Soviet Union's negligence of these agreements only ripened the animosity between the two nations.

At the same time, both countries sought to broaden their influence on the global scale. When the Greek government appealed for international help, Truman called upon the U.S. congress to allocate funds to assist not just Greece, but Turkey as well (Cleveland). Soon after providing aid to Greece and Turkey, it became apparent to the United States that other European countries were in dire need of assistance in restoring their industries, infrastructure, and economies. In 1948, the Marshall Plan was passed, guaranteeing U.S. aid to European countries, including those in Eastern Europe in the Soviets sphere of influence (Cleveland). The United

States' theory was that if "a country was prosperous and its people were happy, then support for communism would not exist" ("Ideological Differences").

Similarly, the Soviet Union fought to maintain a strong influence over the world and did so by controlling Eastern Europe. By managing the satellite states of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union not only expanded their power and influence, but also strengthened communism. Both countries felt overwhelmingly threatened by the other's expansionist and interventionist policies, essentially leading to the creation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact (Cleveland). These treaties shared similar terms in which the signatories formed an alliance, guaranteeing collective security to all countries who signed on. As World War II came to an end, a mutual distrust and hostility sparked across the United States and Soviet Union, ultimately leading to the competition and tension which shaped the Cold War (Cleveland).

NUCLEAR ARMS RACE

In order to maintain their position as a global superpower after World War II, the Soviet Union needed to construct a similar or more powerful weapon than the U.S. made atomic bombs. As a new enemy of the United States., the Soviet Union was extremely threatened by the United States possession of bombs which could obliterate a city in seconds. So, after the explosion of the bombs on Japan, the Soviet Union worked to develop their own form of an atomic bomb (Thee, 19).

Due to the competitive environment between the superpowers, both countries formed departments to work specifically on constructing and testing a

variety of destructive nuclear arms. Just four years after the U.S. dropped the atomic bombs on Japan, the Soviet Union successfully exploded their first nuclear weapon at a test base in Kazakhstan ("U.S.-Russia Nuclear Arms Control"). With the Soviets success in constructing and testing a nuclear bomb, the competition accelerated to have the biggest and strongest weapon.

The next generation of nuclear weapons developed were the thermonuclear bombs. These hydrogen bombs had the potential of being 1,000 times more powerful than the atomic bomb, meaning a bigger blast, shock wave, heat, and radiation (Chan, Melissa). As each nation further developed their nuclear arms program, the explosive yields of each bomb

grew exponentially, expanding the threat and fear of a nuclear war which could destroy humanity and Earth (Thee, 19).

Both countries were consistently competing to produce the stronger bomb to deter the other from attacking and the threat of these attacks changed the way of life for both Americans and Soviets. Bomb shelters were being built across cities, leaders were recommending constructing a bomb shelter in your own home, and public places would often practice nuclear attack drills ("Threat of Nuclear War"). The constant threat made Cold War tensions very prevalent to the everyday lives of Americans and Soviets alike.




Illustration From October 2002 Issue of "Popular Mechanics" (pg. 69)

CASE STUDY I: MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION

After World War II, the United States continued to produce nuclear weapons. The goal was to provide a deterrence - no foreign nation would dare cross the United States and risk facing its nuclear arsenal (Wilde). Between 1953 and 1961, the number of weapons increased from 1,000 to 18,000 (Wilde). Nonetheless, the Soviet Union began to increase their own stockpile, and soon both governments reached the realization that a preemptive, disarming, first strike was no longer a possibility. If either country attacked the other, they could be sure that their opponent would mount an equally devastating counter strike. Thus, the two powers reached an equilibrium point where neither would dare make the first move (Wilde).

In 1962, game theorist and member of the Atomic Energy Commission in the United States John von Neumann coined the term "Mutually Assured Destruction" to describe this "strategy" (Wilde). Soon after, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara described the term in his speech to the American Bar Foundation (de Castella). Throughout the rest of the Cold War, Mutually Assured Destruction, or MAD, was commonly referenced as the primary deterrent to nuclear attacks for both the US and the USSR. In fact, it became so widely agreed upon as the best strategy that the USSR and the US agreed to reduce the development of missile defense systems so that they would both stay vulnerable and maintain the deterrence equilibrium that MAD provided (Wilde).

Today, this equilibrium is used as a classic example of game theory. Consider a situation in which we have Country A and its military opponent Country B.

Ordered from most favorable to least favorable, here are the scenarios country A could find itself in:

1. Country A has nuclear missiles, and Country B does not. This creates a power imbalance favoring Country A.
2. Neither Country A nor Country B has nuclear missiles. There is no power imbalance, and neither country is spending the resources to build their arsenal.
3. Country A and Country B both have nuclear missiles. There is no power imbalance but both countries are spending resources on the production of missiles.
4. Country B has nuclear missiles and Country A does not. This creates a power imbalance favoring Country B.

Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) characterized the Cold War, showcasing tensions and a lack of trust in international relations. Scenario 1 and 4 swap in favorability for Country B, but other scenarios remain fixed. Scenario 2 is optimal for both, yet they gravitate towards scenario 3 to avoid risks associated with scenario 4.

MAD prevented a power imbalance, a key to averting war, but was inherently illogical. The Cuban Missile Crisis emerged from the need to maintain power equilibrium by increasing missile presence near the US. Its resolution hinged on unacted threats. MAD strained resources for both the US and the USSR. Despite relying on fear and mostly empty threats, MAD was surprisingly effective

INTERVENTIONIST POLICIES

In the aftermath of World War II, the U.S. and



U.S.S.R. engaged in interventions to assert global influence and ideologies. The U.S. pursued a containment strategy to thwart Soviet communism, actively involving vulnerable nations. President Truman cited Greece's communist threat, urging Congress for immediate aid. The U.S. justified interventions as a means to promote democracy and preserve its security.

Conversely, the U.S.S.R. aimed to spread communism, mostly refraining from Western Europe interventions. Stalin believed socialism would prevail naturally. However, Soviet interventions occurred elsewhere, like supporting North Korea and influencing Eastern European elections.

Both superpowers fiercely protected their ideologies and security. Truman emphasized the U.S. as a guardian of freedom, receiving requests for assistance. The U.S.S.R. mirrored this approach, extending aid to nations to foster communism. The Korean War exemplifies the superpowers' resolve to contain their rival's ideology. The U.S. intervened to defend South Korea and prevent communism's advance.

Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. and Soviet

Union intervened worldwide, either directly through military involvement or indirectly by providing aid or weaponry, driven by their overarching goal to halt the spread of opposing ideologies.

SPACE RACE

Post-WWII, the USSR prioritized rocket production, making it a key military asset, while the US established NASA as a civilian entity. The Space Race intensified after the Soviet launch of Sputnik in 1957, marking the start of the competition for space supremacy.

Sputnik's launch triggered fear in the US of technological lag, prompting a boost in funding and resources for American space and weapons programs. Khrushchev flaunted Soviet superiority, prompting the US to counter every Soviet advance. Soviet cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin's orbit of Earth in 1961 further fueled the US desire to catch up. Both nations relentlessly enhanced their space capabilities, vying for superiority in all aspects of life.

KEY ACTORS

NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV

Nikita Khrushchev, Premier from 1958, aimed for peaceful coexistence with the US, a departure from Stalin's policies. He sought peaceful competition and believed countries would naturally adopt communism. Khrushchev attended four summits with US Presidents to ease tensions, despite limited success. He advocated de-Stalinization, dismantling oppressive systems and condemning Stalin's brutal methods, triggering disagreement among Soviet officials and contributing to his eventual downfall (Tucker, 559, 570; "Revelations from the Russian Archives").

JOHN F. KENNEDY

John F. Kennedy, president from 1961 to 1963, strongly opposed communism, particularly citing the

threat from neighboring Cuba. He emphasized protecting the U.S. and its allies from Soviet influence, pledging to spare no effort or expense ("Campaign of 1960"; "Inaugural Address"). Kennedy continuously warned about the Soviet Union's growing nuclear arsenal, prompting the U.S. to increase its own arsenal ("Sputnik, 1957").

Following the Bay of Pigs invasion, Kennedy altered his decision-making process, seeking consultation with allies, adhering to international law, and relying on trusted advisors rather than governmental organizations ("The Bay of Pigs"; Feuerherd). His administration prioritized expanding nuclear and space programs, securing funding for NASA and bolstering the missile force and military reserve to compete with the Soviet Union ("Sputnik, 1957").

CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE COLD WAR:

THE CUBAN REVOLUTION

Before becoming a communist stronghold aligned with the USSR, Cuba was ruled by Fulgencio Batista, a U.S.-backed dictator. Batista seized power in a coup during the 1952 elections, prompting U.S. assistance through the Bureau for the Repression of Communist Activities in 1955 to curb communism in Cuba ("Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica"). The U.S. sought to maintain economic and political dependence on American monopolies, supporting Batista's

government ("Boughton, 437").

Fidel Castro, a revolutionary leader, attempted a failed attack on the Army Barracks in Santiago in 1953 and was imprisoned. Released in 1955, he fled to Mexico to plan a revolution for Cuba, returning in 1956 to establish a base in the Sierra Maestra Mountains ("Fidel Castro"). The revolution gained momentum, fueled by Batista's increasing corruption and brutality, causing a decline in U.S. support for his regime.

In 1959, Batista fled Cuba, leading to Castro's rise as prime minister and the formation of a new government. Castro swiftly nationalized Cuban companies, severing ties with American corporations ("The Rise of Castro and the Outbreak of Revolution"). The U.S., once friendly with Cuba, viewed Castro as a major revolutionary threat by 1960, authorizing the CIA to plan for his removal ("Fidel Castro").

The Bay of Pigs program began almost two years prior to the invasion. In March 1960, with President Eisenhower's approval, the CIA established training camps in Guatemala for guerrilla warfare. José Miró Cardona led the anti-Castro Cuban exiles in the United States. Despite U.S. efforts to maintain secrecy, both Cuban exiles in Miami and Castro's intelligence learned of the plan around October of that year. In early 1961, President Kennedy approved the invasion plan.

The American strategy involved a main invading force of paratroopers and air strikes, using repainted World War II B-26 bombers resembling Cuban aircraft to target Cuban air bases. A 1,400-strong invasion force would execute a surprise night attack, landing on both the west and east coasts of Cuba simultaneously to confuse Cuban forces. Simultaneously, the United Revolutionary Front planned to establish a provisional government from their South Florida position.

The success of the entire plan hinged on whether the Cuban population would support the invasion. Without their support, success was unlikely. The invasion got off to a troubled start, with the airstrikes drawing international attention and implicating the United States. Kennedy canceled the second airstrike. On April 17th, the invasion force landed at the Bay of Pigs, facing Cuban air force resistance. Cuban forces

sank two escort ships and destroyed half of the exile air support. Poor weather compounded the ground force's problems, forcing them to contend with wet equipment and inadequate ammunition.



"Attack near Playa Giron" Wikimedia Commons by Rumlin CC BY 3.0 DEED

Castro's counterattack with 20,000 troops hit the ground forces' landing site the next day. Delayed air support, due to a time zone mix-up between Nicaragua and Cuba, under the "air-umbrella" plan failed to shield the ground forces from Cuban retaliation, resulting in the invasion's collapse. Over 1,200 brigade members surrendered, with 100 killed, enduring 20 months in captivity until Robert Kennedy negotiated their release for \$53 million in baby food and medicine. The administration escalated its plans against Cuba, promising the anti-Cuban invaders a "flag in a free Havana."

Afterward, Castro aligned with the USSR, viewed by the Khrushchev administration as a strategic asset equal to West Berlin. Khrushchev sent nuclear weapons to Cuba to signal U.S. commitment to defending and arming allies, albeit the missiles' strategic value in Cuba was minimal. They aimed to psychologically deter U.S. aggression and reshape American public opinion regarding potential threats close to their borders.

Kruschev's son later clarified that the actual strategic positioning of the weapons in Cuba was negligible. The difference was 20 minutes between weapons deployed from Cuba, and elsewhere in the hemisphere from landing in the United States. The true purpose of putting the weapons in Cuba was psychological against the American public. Sergei Kruschev qualified that Americans had never experienced having a potential threat close to their borders as all adversaries were separated by oceans. The purpose of having missiles in Cuba following the invasion was to turn the American public against the idea of aggressing against the Soviets, and to never invade Cuba again (LaGrone).

DOMESTIC CHALLENGES:

While much of this committee will focus on U.S.-Soviet interactions, it's crucial to consider the domestic impacts of directives' actions. During the Cold War, both nations grappled with internal issues amid their global rivalry. Initially, disapproval of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War simmered, gaining momentum in the late 1960s as Kennedy escalated U.S. participation in 1961, fostering dissent and protests (Wolfe).

Another challenge was the pervasive fear of communist infiltration in American society and government ("Second Red Scare"). After the Korean War, concerns of global communism spread, leading to FBI expansion to handle increased inquiries and trials of suspected communists. This hysteria also prompted state governments to form committees akin to the House of Un-American Activities Committee ("Second Red Scare").

In the 1960s, segregation, particularly in the South, persisted, restricting African American voting despite

the Civil Rights Act of 1957 ("Civil Rights Movement"). The Civil Rights Movement gained momentum nationwide, highlighting non-compliance with anti-segregation laws and necessitating federal enforcement ("Civil Rights Movement"). These domestic challenges complemented the U.S.-USSR Cold War rivalry and the Cuban Missile Crisis, shaping a complex era for Americans.

WORLD RELATIONS:

U.S. Relations with the Soviet Union

During the Cold War, the United States pursued a strategy of containment, aiming to prevent the spread of communism. Motivated by the domino theory—where if one nation succumbed to communism, neighboring ones might follow—the U.S. moved to counter every Soviet advancement ("Ideological Differences"). For instance, when the Soviets expanded their military or made technological strides, the U.S. matched them. In 1956, Eisenhower authorized covert flights over Soviet territory to gauge their missile capabilities ("A Look Back"). These missions confirmed the U.S.'s superiority in missiles. But in 1960, the tables turned when the USSR downed a U-2 spy plane, capturing its pilot. The pilot's confession, coupled with the U.S.'s attempts to deny the espionage, aggravated the already tense U.S.-Soviet relationship ("The Day We Shot Down The U-2"). The fallout was evident during the Paris Summit: a fuming Khrushchev exited the discussions due to Eisenhower's refusal to apologize for the U-2 debacle ("The Day We Shot Down The U-2"). This incident further strained ties between the superpowers, undermining Khrushchev's peace efforts.

In 1961, Kennedy and Khrushchev convened at the Vienna meeting, aiming to resolve the ongoing Berlin situation and discussing the issues in Laos

and potential disarmament. Despite their efforts, no concrete agreements were reached, further exacerbating the Berlin conflict (United States Relations with Russia). Shortly after Vienna, Khrushchev issued threats concerning Berlin. In response, Kennedy activated 15,000 reservists and alerted Americans about potential conflict (Carter). During this tension-filled period, defense expenditures soared, and many East Germans escaped to West Germany. However, rather than launching an attack, Khrushchev erected the Berlin Wall, separating East from West (Carter). This division served as a mere band-aid solution to the deep-seated animosity between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., setting the stage for the looming Cuban Missile Crisis. Attempts to establish peace and disarmament had repeatedly faltered.

U.S. RELATIONS WITH CUBA

Shortly after Castro's campaign in December 1958 that seized control from the US-backed anti-socialist president Fulgencio Batista, the Eisenhower administration regarded Castro with cautious optimism. The government hoped that past economic, cultural, and political relations can be used to leverage a dependable ally in reformed Cuba. However, over the next two years, Castro began to nationalize American businesses in Cuba, which led to the loss of millions of American dollars worth of investments in Cuba (Fidel Castro). Furthermore, Castro began showing good relations with the Soviet Union. As a result of these actions, many anti-Castro Cubans began arriving in the US.

By 1960, the Eisenhower administration viewed Castro as a dangerous communist threat and began their plans for the Bay of Pigs invasion. The US government also began to slow trade and impose trade restrictions through the creation of a trade

embargo that prohibited the export of American goods to Cuba except for food and medicine. By October 1960, Cuba strengthened its trade ties with the USSR and, in reaction, the US cut all diplomatic ties with Cuba, removing its embassy in Havana by January 1961 (Fidel Castro).

In 1961, John F Kennedy succeeded Eisenhower. JFK had previously criticized Eisenhower on his inaction which led to a communist country only ninety miles from American shores. For the next six years, the JFK administration undertook several plans to overthrow Castro and the communist threat. In April 1961, the US government launched the Bay of Pigs invasion which ended in US defeat. As a result of the Bay of Pigs invasion, relations between the US and Cuba were permanently damaged (Feuerherd).

In November 1961 JFK created a new Cuba Taskforce—codenamed Operation Mongoose. This operation's goal was "to bring about the revolt of the Cuban people [that] will overthrow the Communist regime and institute a new government with which the United States can live" (Bohning). The JFK administration planned to create political, psychological, and militaristic sabotage and included the planned assassinations of important Cuban politicians (Bohning).

Leading up to the Cuban Missile Crisis, tensions between the countries were high. There were essentially no diplomatic relations between the countries. By 1962, the previous trade embargo heightened to include almost all exports, damaging the Cuban economy as retaliation to Castro's nationalization of private American businesses. The US hoped to topple the Castro government through the new Operation Mongoose which grew out of a failed Bay of Pigs invasion.

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

1. How have past US diplomatic actions escalated tensions with the USSR/Cuba? What were some of the US's biggest failures that soured relations? Knowing these failures, how can the US create diplomatic actions that deescalate tensions during the Cuban Missile Crisis?
2. What role should the US play in the international community? Why does the US fight in so many proxy wars against the USSR? How and do these proxy wars benefit Americans?
3. How should the US balance the act of being the world's superpower while not escalating these situations into war? What are limiting cases you believe draw the line between warranting a diplomatic and violent response?
4. How will the domestic issues of the United States affect foreign policies taken? Should these affect how the United States acts with its foreign policy at all?

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